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Abstract. In most of e-commerce sites evaluation systems are employed to evaluate
each user after trades. Normally, seller’s evaluation score is shown in e-commerce
site and computed based on the score given by buyers. In recent e-commerce sites,
the evaluation is based on multiple attributes and buyers give their thinking for
each attribute. In this viewpoint, the seller evaluation in e-commerce is collected
knowledge from buyers and the synthetic score is computational intelligence because
each buyer makes his/her decision whether he/she trades with the seller. In this
paper, we discuss the computational intelligence of the evaluation system in e-com-
merce. Then, to avoid asymmetric and incomplete information in trades, we design
a mechanism of the trader evaluation. After that, we present some experiments
to show the rate of successful trades in our proposed mechanism. Contributions
of this paper are showing the theoretical discussion of e-commerce computational
intelligence, design of evaluation mechanism and the effectiveness of the proposed
mechanism.
Keywords: Electronic commerce, computational intelligence, information disclo-
sure, mechanism design, evaluation systems
1 INTRODUCTION
Computational intelligence is a form of information that is organized by a bottom-
up information. Some of them are useful and practical when people make decisions.
In the recent years, computational collective intelligence has appeared on the web
and helps users to make their decisions. Particularly, trading evaluation is the
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collected knowledge from users to evaluate traders. It provides the characteristics
of sellers based on a multi-attribute evaluation criteria. As the online market size
develops, the number of crimes and frauds on the internet has been increasing year
by year. Generally, electronic commerce site provides the seller rating function
in order to disclose the seller’s information [3]. Evaluation systems in electronic
marketplaces are strong functions to make a successful trade and to provide safe and
secure trading. Even if the e-commerce site uses a simple evaluation system, the
evaluation system is effective enough to avoid dishonest behavior [4]. The existing
evaluation system has a strong limitation aspect that users input their rating on
unified evaluation attributes. Criteria to be evaluated are also not defined in the
existing evaluation systems. Sellers provide incomplete/incorrect information on an
e-commerce website, buyers cannot make a final statement based on the seller rating
system. In some cases, there is a lot of asymmetric information between buyers and
sellers.
To solve the above mentioned problems in e-commerce and the evaluation sys-
tems, we propose a new evaluation method in which sellers disclose a lot of trustwor-
thy information. In our method, sellers can freely choose evaluation attributes that
are important for the sellers to deal. Evaluation for seller determines the synthetic
evaluation based on number of the attributes. Namely, the total evaluated score
depends on the number of evaluation items. If the seller provides many evaluation
items, our model gives extra points for the seller. When a seller provides a lot of
evaluated information even though each score is not so high, buyers may consider
such seller as a creditable seller. This means a seller has an incentive to disclose
his/her information on the evaluation system as much as possible. Thus, the seller
has an incentive to set more evaluation items that are evaluated by buyers. Latter
in this paper we provide the result of our experiment to clarify the feature of our
model and give some discussion regarding a seller’s strategy.
Contributions of our paper are
1. clarifying evaluation mechanism to promote information disclosure,
2. proving that a seller has a high successful trade providing a lot of attributes
except for the situation where a buyer gives high rating on less attributes, and
3. discussing seller’s best strategy under both models and also actual buyer’s pref-
erences.
In Section 2, we explain what is the collective intelligence in e-commerce. In
Section 3, we explain incomplete information in e-commerce and introduce existing
evaluation systems and some related work. Then, in Section 4, we propose a novel
evaluation model based on the number of displayed information. Section 5 presents
experiments using real data regarding buyer’s preferences and discusses seller’s strat-
egy in each experiment case. Finally, we summarize our study and outline our future
work in Section 6.
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Figure 1. Evaluation system in e-commerce
2 E-COMMERCE COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
2.1 Trader Evaluation System
In the evaluation system of e-commerce, we can view a lot of useful information input
from the past traders. When a seller’s evaluation score is not high, you may not
trade with him/her. When you want to get an item as quickly as possible, you may
focus on the attribute about speedy delivery rather than a total score. Each score
is generally calculated as an average of given scores from past buyers. Also, a total
synthetic score is the average of score of each attribute. Namely, we can identify
the collective intelligence in the evaluation system of e-commerce. Statically, as the
number of sample data increases, the reliability is increased as well.
However, the total score does not reflect the characteristics of sellers. And also,
it does not clarify the trading history because items have different features if the
category is not the same. In next subsection, we show an example where evaluation
scores cannot be compared if the items are categorized in different categories.
2.2 Undifferential Evaluations
Consider when you buy a food in the internet shopping site. You may think about
the speedy delivery when you buy a fresh food like meat. On the other hand,
when you buy a motorcycle, you may think about a detailed information in addition
to multi-attribute evaluation criteria. Also, you may think whether the trader is
trustworthy or not. When you buy an electronic device, you may think about the
country in which the device was made in addition to the brand. In this condition,
the common evaluation criteria should not be used. There is a specific evaluation
attribute for each category.
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2.3 E-Commerce Computational Collective Intelligence
In traditional evaluation system, its method to show the result of evaluation is quite
simple because the evaluation attributes are fixed [18]. However, as shown in the
above subsection, each category has some special feature to be evaluated. Also, the
number of evaluation attributes is different between the categories. However, it is
not easy to decide on the criteria of evaluation. To solve the problem, we propose
a novel method of evaluation in e-commerce. The outline of the method is shown
in the Figures 2 and 3. First, the seller decides on the evaluation attributes. Then,
buyers evaluate sellers on the attribute. When the seller is evaluated by a buyer,
the evaluation criteria are determined clearly. In this process, the evaluation score
is adjusted by our proposed controlled value. Using our method, sellers have the
incentive to disclose the information as much as possible. Also, the sellers have the
incentive to make their trading carefully.
Figure 2. Evaluation criteria
3 PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS
3.1 Incomplete Information
In the internet-based shopping, buyers view items information and sellers informa-
tion based only on displayed information found by the web browser. Buyers cannot
perfectly learn about the actual information from the internet until they receive
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Figure 3. Concept of computational collective evaluation knowledge
purchased items. These situations put out incomplete information, like every exist-
ing electronic commerce web site. In an e-marketplace, differences in the quantity
and quality of information between sellers and buyers are a big issue for both sides.
These situations highlighted the problem on the asymmetric information. Web-
based marketplace has more asymmetric information than actual marketplaces. In
the actual marketplaces, buyers can view items from multiple aspects, sometimes
touch and pick them up. Thus, they can make sure about the material, quality, size,
and several other informations. On the other hand, when users try to buy items on
the electronic marketplace, they cannot touch and pick items up. Further, they just
look at some pictures taken by sellers. Some sellers are in a good faith and honest,
but others may hide or trim the provided information. It makes unfair trades. It
is very important for buyers that there is no information gap between them and
sellers. Unfair issues on the trades cause that buyers sometimes fail in their decision
making to select items. This means that buyers’ utilities are decreased by providing
the unfair information.
3.2 Existing Evaluation Systems
Yahoo! [6], Rakuten [7] and amazon.co.jp [8] are popular e-commerce sites in Japan.
In their system, users can input their evaluation including a total/synthetic eval-
uation and evaluation by free description. Users can find out the latest result of
evaluation and to make decision by viewing whether a trading partner is active or
not. In addition, the overall rating has no clear criteria and trends to be evaluated
according to buyer’s subjective opinion. Although the existing evaluation systems
have these features, buyers can never get a perfect information about sellers and
items with the incomplete and asymmetric information. A lot of causes of criminal
acts are set up by the information problems.
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3.3 Evaluation Differences
Difference of evaluation among sellers affects each buyer’s decision making in the
online auction. For example, we consider a situation where a buyer tries to buy
an item. When there are two seller candidates who deal in the same item on the
same price, the buyer would purchase the item from a seller whose evaluation point
is higher. This means the difference of a total utility and risk affecting the buyer’s
decision making. Even though there is a price difference between each seller’s item,
the buyer rationally chooses the trading partner based on the risk. Let us sup-
pose the total utility is indicated as U and it consists of price P and degree of
risk R based on integration function F . Total utility for first item and seller shows
U1 = F (P1, R1). Total utility for second item and seller shows U2 = F (P2, R2).
Buyer would make decision based on the difference between U1 and U2 rather than
on each difference between P1 and P2, and between R1 and R2. Thus, the buyer
sometimes does not look at the web site if the seller’s evaluation score is rather
low.
3.4 Related Work
A research on the evaluation system in online auction system is very popular and
a lot of contributions are published [10]. Kobayashi analyzed the evaluation mech-
anism on the internet auctions considering its network structure, that is, the rela-
tionship between buyers and sellers [9]. His contribution proposes a new evaluation
model of network structure instead of the evaluation on trades by sellers and buyers.
Further, in the contribution [10], he implemented the evaluation system with the
evaluation algorithm of a web page. He also analyzed it through experiments to
make sure about the effectiveness of the approach.
Ming analyzed the evaluation method of online auction to take in exponential
smoothing [11]. It was analyzed to avoid the cheating because a bad evaluation has
a big impact on seller’s evaluation to give a lot of weight to the last evaluation. It
is a great effect and it is an important tool for the buyer in identifying the seller’s
cheating or unfair behavior in the trade.
Shanshank analyzed the method employing a probabilistic reasoning to extract
discriminative and sketchy traders in internet auction [12].
Fasanghari analyzed the evaluation method to investigate a real customer sat-
isfaction based on fuzzy logic in online commerce [13].
Usui showed that the evaluation system affects the importance on the market
revitalization by comparing the existence or nonexistence of evaluation system [1, 5].
Yamamoto analyzed users behavior information through actual experiments with
test subjects in the internet auctions [14]. He also analyzed important information
for users in the auction.
Ito analyzed the internet auction protocol to permit the Pareto efficient distri-
bution [15]. It shows that the protocol can add measures according to which the
goods quality can be checked and a honest declaration by a specialist can be made
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when there are a lot of asymmetric information and some specialist in the Internet
auction.
However, most of them do not mention the secure mechanism design of the
evaluation system to avoid incomplete and asymmetric information.
4 EVALUATION MODEL
In this section, we propose a new objective evaluation model based on quality and
quantity of disclosure of information. First, we put and attach the concept of criteria
to evaluate. In existing evaluation systems, users are sometimes confused because
of no criteria for evaluation. For example, popular e-commerce sites provide only
synthetic evaluation. Some other sites provide multiple attributes to evaluate like
“Speedy deliver”, “Politeness to customers”, and several others. However, how do
sellers gain a good evaluation about “Speedy deliver”? How do sellers get a positive
score about “Attitude to buyers” ? Even though a seller does use the same attitude
in helping and taking care of the customer, each evaluation from buyer would be
different. Thus, to make more useful information, our proposed evaluation system
sets concrete criteria. Further, we set an incentive model for sellers to grow and
improve their trading skills.
4.1 Model
• Evaluation index for sellers in the evaluation by buyers is defined as I = {1, 2,
. . . , i, . . . , n}.
• Impression value A = {α1, α2, . . . , αi, . . . , αn} is defined as an impression when
a buyer looks at the item’s information on the e-commerce site.
• Impression value B = {β1, β2, . . . , βi, . . . , βn} is defined as an impression after
a buyer received the item.
When the attribute is αi = βi, buyer’s impressions are the same on the item
information on the web and the fresh information. When the attribute is αi >
βi, buyer’s impression at the item browsing is better than the impression after
he/she received the item. When the attribute is αi < βi, buyer’s impression
at the item browsing is not better than the impression after he/she received the
item.
4.2 Evaluation from Trading Partners
Even though an expression value and the item information value are the same, sensi-
tivity and feeling of the explanation and introduction of items are different for each
buyer. When evaluations are given using a stage assessment model, each buyer eval-
uates based on his/her multiple scale. To avoid such dispersion, we set a criterion
for each evaluation attribute. For example, when the delivered item is evaluated on
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the sameness between the actual item and the picture shown at the e-commerce site,
we give a certain criterion like shown in Table 1. The adjusted values of important
criteria are higher and the values of unimportant criteria are lower. The values can
be changed by the e-commerce site manager.
Criteria Rate
Delivered item is same with the picture on the web 1.5
Actual item’s size is same with the description on the web 1.3
...
Table 1. Example of criteria and adjusted values
We consider the case when a seller deals in a brand-new item. When delivered
item is without any scuff and it is perfectly the same with the picture on the web
site, buyers must evaluate “so good” and give 3 points. When the item has a small
scuff, buyers evaluate “acceptable” and give 2 points. When the item has a dent or
chippage, buyers evaluate “rejectable” and give 1 point. When the item is not deliv-
ered, buyers evaluate “Hopeless case” and do not add any points. We give another
example about delivery. When the item is delivered in 3 days after the payment,
buyers must evaluate “so good” and give 3 points. When the item is delivered in
7 days after the payment, buyers evaluate “acceptable” and give 2 points. When
the item is delivered in 14 days after the payment, buyers evaluate “non-desirable”
and give 1 point. When the item is not delivered, buyers evaluate “Hopeless case”
and do not add any points.
On the other hand, when a seller deals in the used item and delivers to over-
seas, the evaluation attribute becomes different from the above mentioned examples.
When delivered item is perfectly the same with the explanation on the web site, buy-
ers must evaluate “so good” and give 3 points. When the item is more suspicious
than the explanation, buyers evaluate “acceptable” and give 2 points. When the
item has a serious defect without any explanation, buyers evaluate “rejectable” and
give 1 point. When the item is not delivered, buyers evaluate “Hopeless case” and
do not add any points.
Thus, incomplete information are reduced by these evaluations based on com-
parison between actual things and criteria. If a lot of buyers evaluate attributes
in which the original item is different from the picture on the web in the past,
the seller is known as a person who does not deal in the acceptable item. Our
proposed model provides more concrete information comparing it with the existing
e-commerce sites.
4.3 Evaluation from the System
4.3.1 Information Disclosure
Our proposed model is based on number of information disclosure. Multiple at-
tributes to evaluate are prepared and a seller selects attributes based on his/her
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strengths. If he/she is good at packing, he/she can choose the “Package” as the
evaluated attribute. On the other hand, if he/she does not want to disclose his
weakness, he/she can omit the attribute to be evaluated. To design a desirable
mechanism in evaluation, we set a control value based on number of information
disclosure. When a seller changes five attributes from four attributes to be evalu-
ated, the system gives an incentive points to the seller. Namely, if the seller discloses
more attributes, the incentive points are given in proportion. Thus, he/she sets up
a lot of attributes to get many incentive points. And also, incomplete information
are reduced from the shopping site. However, if he/she does so, he/she needs to be
careful in each activity on the trade.
If a seller provides an item’s information by pictures and explanation, a risk on
the trade is decreased [16, 17].
4.3.2 Accumulative Extra Point
Here, we define an experience value based on the accumulative number of trades
for each hotel. In existing evaluation systems, the score/rating of evaluation is
calculated simple accumulative trading experience. For example, when a hotel
has 30 positive rating without any negative rating and he/she gets a positive rat-
ing in a subsequent trade, his/her score rating is 31. However, we propose an
appreciate model for outstanding hotels. The outline of the model is that the
system gives an extra point for a hotel which continues a lot of trading without
negative rating from travelers. On the other hand, once he/she gets a negative
point, the accumulative number goes back to the start. For example, when a ho-
tel has accumulative positive rating 100 without any negative rating and he/she
gets a positive rating in a subsequent trade, the system gives an extra score auto-
matically. Thus, the marketplace positions outstanding hotels apart from the rest
hotels.
A number of successful continuous trading D
cj
ik,hl
is decided by the number of




is based on the number of successful trades of kth attribute on Ith
trading.
We show the algorithm considering the evaluation from the system about the
number of successful continuous trading D
cj
ik,hl
. The rate of increasing the num-
ber of successful continuous trading D
cj
ik,hl
is γ. If the hotel gets good evaluations
continuously, γ increases. Otherwise, γ is reduced. If the hotel has a negative evalu-
ation after a lot of good evaluations, added point becomes Dcik,hl that is excluded γ.
Namely, the accumulative point D
cj
ik,hl








In our model, we are showing the range of the evaluation as −1, 0, and 1.
Analysis of Successful Trades Information Disclosure Mechanism 1349
begin
for j ← 1 step 1 to n do
for l← 1 step 1 to o do









































































Question (1): Which do you have prefer buying
in e-commerce, products low prices, high seller’s
rating or both low price and high evaluation?
Priority Item Price Evaluation Both Others
Totals Num. 13 4 39 1
Table 2. Questionnaire result (1)
5 EXPERIMENTS
We conducted experiments to measure our proposed model. When the system
changed the evaluation depending on the number of evaluation attributes, we search-
ed the market conditions where buyer can have dealings with confidence. In the
market conditions, we configured
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Question (2): When there are variety sellers disclosing some
evaluation attributes between one to ten, how many is your
desirable number of evaluation attributes?
Attributes Num. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Totals Num. 3 0 5 5 20 10 3 5 0 6
Table 3. Questionnaire result (2)
1. Buyer takes precedence elements in dealing,
2. Buyer has an impression to concern the evaluation for seller when buyer looks
at multiple attributes,
3. About the number of each buyer type defined by 1. and 2.
In the definition of 1., the experiments assumed three buyer types including price-
oriented (PO), evaluation-oriented (EO), and neutral buyers (N) in the marketplace.
Price-oriented buyers prefer a low price item rather than rating of evaluation to
decide a seller to trade. Evaluation-oriented buyers have a trend to choose sellers
with rating of evaluation rather than item’s price. Neutral buyers have both above
features. In the definition of 2., we set that buyer has a good impression on the
specific number of evaluation attributes and gives seller one level higher rating. In
the definition of 3., we investigated how many buyer types are defined because we
did not know whether it exists in the actual marketplace.
5.1 Survey
We made a survey with fifty-seven people for order to set parameters for our exper-
iments. We asked two questions.
Question (1): Which do you prefer when buying the item in e-commerce: low
prices, high seller’s rating or both low price and high evaluation?
Question (2): When there are various sellers disclosing some evaluation attributes
between one to ten, how many evaluation attributes are desirable for you?
Table 2 shows the questionnaire result regarding buyer’s preference in online
market. From questioner’s answer in the question (1), most of them are interested
in both low price items and high evaluation sellers. And there are few questioners
who make a point of only high evaluation of the seller. Table 3 shows the question-
naire result regarding buyer’s impression about number of evaluation attributes.
From questioner’s answer in the question (2), many questioners prefer around five
evaluation attributes. Result in the question (2) looks like a normal probability
distribution between one and ten. Into the experiments we involved the distribution
of each buyer type received from the above result.
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5.2 Setting
In the marketplace, rating of evaluation is rated through 1 to 5 of integers. Item’s
price is assumed between $ 400 and $ 600 chosen by a normal distribution on dis-
tribution value 50. The average of price of sold items is $ 500. We assume three
types of buyers preferences. First, if the buyer has the preference about price of
item, the threshold of decision-making Dp is shown as Equation (1). If Ps is larger






Second, if the buyer has the preference about seller’s evaluation, the threshold
of decision-making De is shown as Equation (2). If Es is larger than the equation,





Third, if buyer is neutral about the price and seller’s evaluation, the threshold
of decision-making Dn is shown as Equation (3). If Es/3−Ps/500 is larger than the
equation, buyer trades with a seller who deals in at the highest value (than threshold







• p indicates item’s price and e indicates rating of evaluation.
• Ps indicates item’s price shown by seller.
• Es indicates seller’s rating of evaluation.
In the setting of experiments, four types of evaluation trends are assumed with
number of evaluated attributes. The number of evaluated attributes is between 1
and 10.
We assume four types of evaluation given for the seller. The following is detail
of each evaluation type.
Experiments Number of Buyer’s Type
Experiments Case 1: PO = 100, EO = 100, N = 100, EP = 0
(A), (B), Case 2: PO = 100, EO = 100, N = 100, EP = 1
(C), (D) Case 3: PO = 69, EO = 21, N = 210, EP = 0
Case 4: PO = 69, EO = 21, N = 210, EP = 1
Table 4. Experiment setting
(A) Average of evaluation value monotonically increases when the number of eval-
uated attributes increases.
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(B) When the number of evaluated attributes increases, the average of evaluation
value increases exponentially.
(C) When the number of evaluated attributes increases, the average of evaluation
value increases with a marginal decreasing.
(D) When the number of evaluated attributes is around 5, it tends for buyers to
give high rating like in a normal distribution.
Table 5 shows types of evaluation used in experiments. Horizontal axis shows
the number of evaluation attribute, vertical axis shows the distribution of average
evaluation. These evaluation types include both the rating given by the buyer and
the extra point from number of evaluation attributes.
Depending on characteristics of buyers, some of them give a low rate of eval-
uation when a seller provides a lot of evaluation attributes because the evaluating
activities are not simple and make buyers bothered to fill in the form. We have
considered such situation in our simulation.
Table 4 is a setting of 4 cases of experiments. Buyer’s preferences are shown as
PO, EO, and N. PO indicates the buyer’s preference in which he/she has a price-
oriented preference. EO indicates the preference in which he/she has an evaluation-
oriented preference. N indicates a neutral buyer who has the preference both in
price and evaluation. In cases 1 and 2, we assume there is the same number of
types of buyers in the market. In cases 3 and 4, the rates of buyer’s preferences
are respectively used from our survey result shown in Table 2. EP indicates the
condition where the number of attributes effect buyer’s input to evaluate. When
EP = 0, number of evaluation attributes are not effected in an evaluation by buyers.
When EP = 1, some buyers give a high rate when the number of attributes to be
evaluated is the same as their preferences shown in Table 3. For example, when
a buyer prefers that the number of attributes is 6, he/she gives a high rate if the
trader provides 6 attributes to be evaluated. In the experiment, we assume that
buyer gives 1 additional rate in such case.
Results of the experiments shows the average of rate of successful trade in
1 000 trials. We assume that there are three hundred potential buyers and one
hundred potential sellers to trade.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(A) 3 3.15 3.3 3.45 3.6 3.75 3.9 4.05 4.2 4.35
(B) 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.2
(C) 3 3.6 4.2 4 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
(D) 3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4 4.2 3.9 3.5 3
Table 5. Evaluation given seller
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Case 1 .31 .32 .35 .38 .43 .46 .50 .53 .56 .58
Case 2 .31 .32 .36 .42 .49 .50 .51 .53 .56 .59
Case 3 .30 .33 .35 .37 .41 .43 .46 .48 .49 .49
Case 4 .30 .33 .36 .41 .47 .45 .47 .48 .49 .50
Table 6. Experiment (A) result
5.3 Result of Experiment
Experiment results are shown in Tables 6 to 9. Each experiment condition re-
spectively employed the evaluation types (A), (B), (C), and (D). Horizontal axis
indicates the number of evaluation attributes, vertical axis indicates the rate of
successful trade in graphs.
5.3.1 Experiment (A)
In this experiment, the type (A) in Table 5 is used as the buyers’ trend. Table 6
shows the result of experiment on a setting of Experiment (A) in Table 4. When
the evaluation given by buyers and by the system is high, the successful trade rate
is also high in the marketplace. When each buyer type exists respectively the same
rate, the transaction success rate is flat in the number of each evaluation attribute.
On the other hand, when we employ a condition of cases 3 and 4, the successful
trade rate is high when the number of evaluation attributes is between 5 and 10.
This means that the seller’s best strategy is to define 5 or more attributes to be
evaluated.
5.3.2 Experiment (B)
In this experiment, the type (B) in Table 5 is used as the buyers’ trend. Table 7
shows the experiment result on a setting of Experiment (B) in Table 4. When the
average of the evaluations given by buyers and by the system is three or less (see
the type (B) in Table 5), effect of the impression value is low. In cases 3 and 4, the
rate of successful trade is extremely low. The best strategy for sellers is to provide
a lot of attributes to be evaluated.
5.3.3 Experiment (C)
In this experiment, the type (C) in Table 5 is used as the buyers’ trend. Table 8 shows
the experiment result on a setting of Experiment (C) in Table 4. The successful trade
is high on the number of evaluation attributes between 3 and 5. On the other hand,
in cases 3 and 4, the number of successful trades is quite low on the number of
evaluation attributes between 7 and 10. This means that the seller’s best strategy
is to prepare 4 attributes or around 4 to be evaluated. Only this result shows that
the seller should not provide more than 5 evaluation attributes.
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5.3.4 Experiment (D)
In this experiment, the type (D) in Table 5 is used as the buyers’ trend. Table 9
shows the experiment result on a setting of Experiment (D) in Table 4. In the Cases 1
and 2, successful trades are the highest between 5 and 8. Considering actual trades,
the seller’s best strategy is to define attributes between 6 and 7 to be evaluated.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Case 1 .27 .27 .28 .29 .30 .32 .35 .42 .50 .56
Case 2 .27 .27 .28 .30 .32 .34 .36 .43 .50 .56
Case 3 .23 .25 .26 .28 .29 .32 .35 .41 .46 .49
Case 4 .23 .25 .26 .28 .33 .33 .36 .40 .46 .49
Table 7. Experiment (B) result
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Case 1 .31 .43 .56 .52 .45 .38 .32 .29 .26 .26
Case 2 .31 .42 .57 .54 .51 .42 .32 .29 .27 .26
Case 3 .30 .41 .49 .47 .42 .37 .32 .28 .23 .21
Case 4 .31 .41 .49 .48 .47 .41 .33 .28 .23 .21
Table 8. Experiment (C) result
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Case 1 .31 .33 .37 .43 .48 .52 .56 .50 .40 .31
Case 2 .31 .33 .38 .45 .54 .55 .56 .50 .40 .31
Case 3 .30 .33 .37 .41 .44 .47 .49 .46 .39 .30
Case 4 .30 .33 .39 .43 .48 .48 .49 .47 .39 .31
Table 9. Experiment (D) result
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we designed the evaluation model in which sellers have an incentive
to disclose a lot of information about the item and about themselves. Except for
the situation where buyers do not want to evaluate a lot of attributes, the seller can
get highly successful trades if he/she provides 4 or more attributes. By using our
proposed method, users evaluate sellers more precisely because our method provides
concrete criteria to be evaluated. Our model is based on a multiple attribute eval-
uation including evaluation from the buyer and the system. System gives an extra
point based on the number of evaluation attributes set by sellers. Even though
a seller is good at packaging, the system discounts the rating as a penalty when
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he/she chooses only one attribute “packaging” as a detailed rating. Our model is
efficient to promote information disclosure, to reduce incomplete, and to decrease
asymmetric information.
Our future work includes analyses and modeling of situations where buyer’s
preferences to evaluate are changing dynamically.
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